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Dispute Settlement in the Law of the Sea Convention and Territorial and Maritime 





The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) provides for a dispute 
settlement regime that establishes a compulsory and binding framework for the peaceful 
settlement of all ocean-related disputes. In Southeast Asia, despite the longstanding myriad 
of territorial and maritime disputes, there appears to be a general reluctance to utilize the 
dispute settlement provisions of LOSC. The region has very little experience in international 
litigation involving territorial and maritime disputes and a reluctance to utilize the dispute 
settlement provisions of LOSC. Whilst the LOSC legal framework offers some options, the 
highly complicated nature of the disputes in the region especially those pertaining to the 
overlapping and conflicting claims over the South China Sea, cultural factors and other 
pragmatic considerations, test the limits of international law and obscure the possibility of a 
legal solution.  
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The peaceful settlement of disputes over territory and over unresolved maritime boundaries 
is fundamental for the prevention of inter-State conflict and often a necessary pre-condition 
for the exploration and exploitation of resources and the preservation and protection of the 
marine environment. (Blake, 1998, pp. 3-27; Kwiatkowska, 1993, pp. 77-78) Disputed 
territorial sovereignty and contested maritime boundaries impair maritime security, hamper 
effective inter-State cooperation, compromise sustainable use of scarce natural resources, 
and hinder the flow of goods and resources. (Buszynski and Sazlan,  2007, p. 143; Prabhakar, 
2007, pp. 34-48) However, despite the unarguable imperative for clearly delineated State 
boundaries, many of the world’s territorial and maritime boundaries have yet to be resolved 
and delimited. (Smith, 1982, p. 3; Prescott and Schofield, 2005, p. 245; Antunes, 2003, pp. 4-
5). In the resolution of these disputes, States submit their competing claims before an 
international court or tribunal for adjudication, effected through an agreement on the basis 
of international law. Consequently, there have been more judgments and awards 
concerning maritime boundary disputes than any other aspect of international law, an 
apparently continuing trend.  (Kaikobad, 2002, pp. 1-86; Charney, 1994, p. 227) 
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) provides for a dispute 
settlement mechanism that establishes a compulsory and binding framework for the 
peaceful settlement of all ocean-related disputes. However, it must be emphasized that the 
rules laid down in the LOSC proceeds from the premise of existing and uncontested land 
features and could not be invoked as a source of title to territory. International law provides 
for five traditional modes of acquiring sovereignty: occupation, prescription, accretion, 
cession and conquest. (Jennings, 1963; Sharma, 1997, p. 5). The LOSC does not directly 
address disputes over sovereignty. The LOSC contains provisions, rather,  for the 
delimitation of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the continental 
shelf, Articles 15, 74 and 83 of the LOSC, respectively. 
It is clear that the LOSC does not address issues of competing claims to sovereignty over 
maritime features. The answer to the question of ownership over disputed insular features 
is not in the LOSC. This is addressed in public international law, of which the Law of the Sea, 
is a part. The rules governing the acquisition of territory are well established in customary 
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international law and in international jurisprudence. It is not a shortcoming of the 
Convention that it does not address this issue. However, whilst the LOSC does not contain 
substantive provisions regarding solutions to address competing issues of ownership, it does 
provide for a dispute settlement mechanism which allows States parties to submit disputes 
(concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention) to a binding procedure as 
specified in Part XV, including sovereignty disputes with their consent, and in the forum of 
their choice, if they so please. 
In the case of Southeast Asia, despite the longstanding myriad of territorial and maritime 
disputes, there appears to be a general reluctance to utilize the dispute settlement 
provisions of LOSC. Generally, the states in Southeast Asia have very little experience in 
litigation at the international level with regard to the settlement of territorial and maritime 
disputes, with only three disputes referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and two 
cases submitted to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to date. The first 
territorial dispute case referred to the ICJ was in 1959 concerning the Temple of Preah 
Vihear between Cambodia and Thailand; the second was in 1998 when Indonesia and 
Malaysia went to the ICJ to resolve their sovereignty dispute over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau 
Sipadan (at which the Philippines filed an unsuccessful intervention in 2001); and the last 
was in 2003 when Malaysia and Singapore jointly submitted a request to resolve their 
territorial disputes regarding Pedra Branca (known as Pulau Batu Puteh in Malaysia), Middle 
Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore). The two ITLOS cases were: Case No. 12, 
concerning land reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor between 
Malaysia and Singapore and Case No. 16, concerning delimitation of the maritime boundary 
between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal. 
Since the LOSC came into force in 1994, there have been nine (9) Annex VII arbitrations. The 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), is acting, or has acted, as registry in eight of those 
cases. The PCA, it must be noted, is not a court in the conventional sense but an 
administrative organization providing registry services to resolve disputes arising out of 
treaties and agreements with the provision for arbitration (Brownlie, 2008, 703; Starke, 
1984, 466, who notes of its “peculiar” nature as it neither “permanent” nor is it a “court.”) 
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There have been three (3) LOSC Annex VII arbitrations filed by states in the region where the 
PCA has acted as registry. The first one is the arbitration between Bangladesh and India 
concerning the delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal instituted in 
October 2009 and is still pending. The second one is the arbitration between Malaysia and 
Singapore, instituted in July 2003 and terminated by an award on agreed terms rendered in 
2005. Finally, the third case is the arbitration filed by the Philippines against China 
principally challenging, inter alia, China’s claim in the South China Sea. (Bautista, 2013, pp. 
520-524)  
This paper will explore why the majority of territorial disputes in Southeast Asia have very 
little likelihood of being resolved through international adjudication especially through the 
dispute settlement regime under the LOSC. It will investigate the reasons behind the general 
reluctance among Southeast Asian countries to submit their disputes to a third-party 
dispute settlement procedure and also look at other methods of dispute resolution available 
at the international level.  
This paper will be of three parts. The first part will describe the general principles of 
international law on the settlement of disputes and the system of dispute settlement in Part 
XV of the LOSC. The second part will look at the maritime region of Southeast Asia with an 
overview of territorial and maritime disputes in the region. The last part will discuss 
opportunities, challenges and recommendations.  
1. International law on the settlement of disputes  
1.1. General principles 
International law once allowed the use of armed force as a means for States to resolve their 
disputes. Brownlie opines that State practice of 19th century Europe permitted the resort to 
war as a form of dispute settlement being an attribute of Statehood. (2008, p. 730) The 
illegality of the use of force by States is now considered a customary rule of international 
law, permissible only in the exercise of individual or collective self-defence or in certain 
exceptional instances allowed in customary law. (Brownlie, 2002, p. 130) The Charter of the 
United Nations (UN Charter, 1945) in Article 2(3) provides that “All Members shall settle 
their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace 
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and security, and justice, are not endangered.” At present, the prohibition on the threat or 
use of force is not only a treaty obligation but has attained the status of a customary 
principle of international law binding upon all States. (Shaw, 2008, p. 1123; Gray, 2008, p. 
30) 
The UN Charter in Article 33 further provides that the parties to any dispute likely to 
endanger international peace and security are obliged to seek a solution by negotiation, 
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies 
or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. The LOSC in Article 279 
explicitly refers to both Articles 2(3) and 33 of the UN Charter thereby reiterating the 
obligation of states parties to the convention to settle disputes by peaceful means.  
The UN Charter clearly states that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal 
judicial organ of the United Nations. (Article 92, UN Charter) The ICJ exercises jurisdiction 
over legal disputes between States on issues of international law referred to it by the parties 
on the basis of the consent of the parties. (Article 36(1), ICJ Statute, 1945; Shaw, 2008, p. 
1075) The ICJ will not take cognizance of a case involving a State unless both parties to the 
dispute have given their consent.  
The ICJ has had a long history in resolving law of the sea disputes. It is widely recognised 
that the Court has particular expertise in territorial and maritime boundary cases. 
(Kwiatkowska, 2002) The pre-eminence of the ICJ in this area of international law has been 
firmly established from the earliest case filed with the court in 1947, the Corfu Channel to 
the latest one, which was promulgated in 2012, the Territorial and Maritime Dispute 
between Nicaragua and Colombia.  
In 2013, out of eleven pending cases before the ICJ, three involve territorial and maritime 
boundary issues, the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger) filed in 2010, Maritime Dispute 
(Peru v. Chile) filed in 2008, the Request for interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 
in the case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) filed in 2011. 
There is also another law of the sea-related case currently pending with the ICJ concerning 
Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan, New Zealand intervening) filed in 2010. There 
have been more judgments and awards concerning maritime boundary disputes than any 
other aspect of international law, a trend which is apparently continuing. 
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1.2. Dispute Settlement within the framework of the LOSC 
The dispute resolution mechanism integrated into the LOSC is both complex and innovative. 
The compulsory adjudicative procedures in the LOSC are a sharp departure from traditional 
international dispute settlement where consent of the parties is normally required before 
the submission of a dispute to arbitration or adjudication. (Klein, 2009, 2) It is considered a 
central pillar of the convention and part of the delicate compromises included in the 
“package deal” of negotiations that led to the adoption of the LOSC in 1982. (Adede, 1987, 
p. 241). In order to preserve this delicate balance, the LOSC clearly prohibits States from 
making any reservations or exceptions. (Article 309, LOSC) According to Klein, “No additional 
form of consent is required once a State is party to the Convention – consent to be bound 
by UNCLOS includes consent to compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions (subject 
to Sections 1 and 3 of Part XV). Under Section 2, the States in dispute do not need (both or 
all) to consent to the referral of the dispute to  court or tribunal, but the dispute can be 
submitted at the behest of just one of the disputant States.” (2009, p. 53). 
The dispute settlement system under the LOSC is contained in Part XV of the Convention. 
The provisions of Part XV are only applicable when there is a ‘dispute’ and it relates to either 
the ‘interpretation’ or ‘application’ of the Convention. (Article 286, LOSC) In addition to the 
requirement that there is a dispute, the dispute must be ‘legal’ or ‘justiciable’ in that it must 
be capable of being settled by the application of principles and rules of international law. 
(Lauterpacht, 2011, p. 64) Furthermore, Article 293 of the LOSC states that the court or 
tribunal having jurisdiction shall apply the Convention and “other rules of international law 
not incompatible with this Convention.” The dispute settlement regime in Part XV of the 
LOSC is comprised of 3 sections. Section 1 contains the general provisions concerning 
dispute settlement; Section 2 outlines the compulsory procedures entailing binding 
decisions, and Section 3 provides for the limitations and exceptions to the applicability of 
Section 2. 
The question of what constitutes a legal dispute is an old and enduring question but not 
exactly a perplexing question in international law. (Amerasinghe, 2009, pp. 46-47) There 
have been several international cases in the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) 
and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which squarely addressed this issue such as the 
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1924 PCIJ case of Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions between Greece and Great Britain 
and the ICJ decisions in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua between Nicaragua and the United States of America and the 2004 ICJ 
Advisory Opinion in the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, and indeed by a number of scholars. The PCIJ definition enunciated in 
the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case, that a ‘dispute is a disagreement on a point of 
law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two persons (1924 PCIJ (Ser. A) 
No. 2, p. 11) and the ICJ’s ruling in the Interpretation of the Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Romania, Advisory Opinion of 30 March 1950, as ‘a situation in which the two 
sides held clearly opposite views concerning the question of the performance or non-
performance of certain treaty obligations,’ (1950 ICJ Rep. 65, p. 74) have been widely 
adopted by other international tribunals. (Schreuer, 2008, p. 960) 
The issue of whether a dispute exists is in fact a crucial one and of particular relevance to 
the discourse of disputes in Southeast Asia, especially in the context of the strong 
nationalist rhetoric utilized in the disputes over the South China Sea. China, for instance, has 
repeatedly claimed that it exercises “indisputable sovereignty” over the South China Sea. 
(Dillon, 2011, p. 54; To, 1999, p. 166) In principle, a dispute which is purely political without 
any legal connotations is not justiciable and cannot be taken cognizance of by any 
international court or tribunal. In fact, in actual practice, parties to a dispute refute the 
existence of a dispute for the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of an international court 
or tribunal. (Schreuer, 2008, p. 959) In the case of the LOSC, if a dispute arises whether a 
court or tribunal has jurisdiction, that court or tribunal is vested with the power to resolve 
the issue (Article 288, LOSC). It is well to remember that a dispute hardly ever presents itself 
as a purely legal question, and often, raises both legal as well as political issues. This is true 
for most of the territorial and maritime disputes in Southeast Asia. These disputes not only 
test the limits of the dispute settlement provisions of the LOSC but also restrain the parties 
from considering international adjudicative processes as a viable alternative to resolve their 
longstanding unresolved territorial and maritime issues.  
1.2.1. The compulsory and binding nature of the LOSC dispute settlement regime  
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The dispute settlement mechanism provided under the legal framework of LOSC establishes 
a compulsory and binding framework for the pacific settlement of all ocean-related 
disputes. (Rayfuse, 2005, pp. 683-711, Sheehan, 2005, pp. 165-190). The LOSC in Part XV 
requires States Parties to settle any dispute between them concerning the interpretation or 
application of the Convention by peaceful means in accordance with Article 2 (3), of the UN 
Charter “in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not 
endangered.” States parties are supposed to seek a solution by any of the means indicated 
in Article 33 (1), of the UN Charter, that is, through “negotiation, inquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, other peaceful 
means of their choice.” 
The LOSC gives primacy for States to reach an agreement on the basis of international law in 
order to achieve an equitable solution in the delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf 
between States (Article 74(1) and 83(1), LOSC). However, when States have been unable to 
reach agreement within “a reasonable time,” the States concerned are obliged to resort to 
the procedures in Part XV of the Convention. (Articles 74(2) and 83(2), LOSC). 
More importantly, submission to the compulsory procedures is not automatic since States 
may still reserve the right under Article 298 to have certain specified categories of disputes 
exempted from the compulsory fora. In such an instance, compulsory conciliation becomes 
the default procedure where Article 298(1)(a) operates to exempt a State or a dispute from 
compulsory adjudication. However, this only applies in a limited circumstance and the 
conciliation itself does not create a binding result. Thus far, it has never been initiated.  
The optional exceptions to the compulsory procedure in Article 298 show the clear intention 
to remove maritime boundaries delimitation disputes from compulsory judicial settlement. 
These elaborate mechanisms are designed to preserve the sovereignty of States by giving 
the State parties the freedom to choose the manner by which they will settle their 
differences.  (See and compare, Annex V, Article 3; Annex VI, Article 4; Annex VII, Article 3; 
and Annex VII, Article 3, LOSC; Treves, 1999; Adede, 1977) 
The dispute settlement mechanism within the framework of the LOSC clearly creates an 
obligation among the claimant countries to settle their conflicting claims peacefully by any 
means of their own choice. (Article 280, LOSC; Adede, 1977-1978; Sohn, 1974-1975) 
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However, McDorman asserts that the dispute settlement procedure of the LOSC is not part 
of customary law and, thus, is only binding upon those states which are parties to the LOSC. 
(2000, p. 259) Furthermore, the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes 
operates on the basis of the sovereign equality of States, a fundamental premise upon 
which the whole architecture of international law operates. This implies that as a subject of 
international law, every State is equal to every other State, regardless of size, or even 
economic or political power. It is also independent and cannot be compelled to participate 
in any legal procedure without its consent. (Anand, 1966; Brown, 1915; Armstrong, 1920) 
The compulsory settlement mechanism within the framework of the LOSC is triggered only 
as an option where the parties are not able to settle their differences by peaceful means of 
their choice. (Article 286, LOSC) But, even then, the submission of a dispute to such a forum 
depends on the willingness of the parties. In this regard, the dispute resolution mechanism 
may appear to offer no progress over previous regimes. This is actually not the case. In 
international law there is really no judicial forum with compulsory jurisdiction. Any form of 
third party dispute resolution is founded upon the assent of the parties involved. The lack of 
compulsion to submit to compulsory judicial forums under the LOSC is neither a serious 
drawback nor does it fall short of legitimate expectations. The LOSC dispute settlement 
regime improves upon the Optional Protocol system in the sense that in the case of the 
former, States become automatically bound by the compulsory procedures upon ratification 
of the LOSC; whereas under the latter, States become bound only when they become 
parties to the Protocol. Nonetheless, ultimately, this means still that the dispute settlement 
regime of the LOSC is only as good as the claimant States are willing to formally invoke it.  
1.2.2. The choice of procedure in LOSC disputes  
The LOSC provides the general rule that any dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application of the Convention, provided no settlement has been reached by the parties 
using any peaceful means of their choice, is subject to the system of compulsory procedures 
entailing binding decisions in Section 2, Part XV of the LOSC. (Article 286, LOSC)  This is, of 
course, subject to the limitations and exceptions to the applicability of Section 2 of Part XV 
as specified in Section 3 of Part XV. (Articles 297 and 298, LOSC) The parties to a dispute 
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have the obligation to exchange views (Article 283, LOSC) and to exhaust local remedies 
where this is required by international law. (Article 295, LOSC) 
If a settlement has not been reached, the LOSC stipulates that the dispute be submitted at 
the request of any party to the dispute to a court or tribunal having jurisdiction in this 
regard. (Article 286, LOSC) The LOSC defines those courts or tribunals as: (a) the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (established in accordance with Annex VI of the 
Convention) including the Seabed Disputes Chamber; (b) the International Court of Justice; 
(c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII of the Convention; and (d) a 
special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII for one or more of the 
categories of disputes specified therein. (Article 287, LOSC) The availability of a variety of 
forums was a compromise to secure consensus during the negotiations for the compulsory 
dispute settlement provisions of the LOSC. (Charney, 1996, 71) 
The LOSC gives the State party the freedom to choose, by means of a written declaration 
submitted when signing, ratifying or acceding to the convention or at any time thereafter, 
one or more of the above courts or tribunals. (Article 287(1), LOSC) If States Parties to a 
dispute have accepted the same procedure, the dispute will be referred to that procedure, 
unless the parties agree otherwise. (Article 287(4), LOSC) If a State party to a dispute is not 
covered by a declaration in force, it shall be deemed to have accepted arbitration under 
Annex VII. (Article 287 (3), LOSC) If the States Parties to the dispute have not accepted the 
same procedure, the dispute may only be submitted to arbitration under Annex VII, unless 
the parties agree otherwise. (Article 287(5), LOSC) 
1.2.3. Limitations and exceptions to compulsory binding dispute settlement  
The prohibition upon States parties to make any reservations or exceptions to the 
Convention under Article 309 necessitated that exceptions and limitations had to be 
allowed in the compulsory dispute settlement regime of the LOSC, which is provided for in 
Section 3 of Part XV of the LOSC. These basically cover matters which are considered of vital 
national concern to a State to oblige it to submit to any binding dispute settlement regime. 
(Klein, 2009, p. 122) Specifically, there are two categories of disputes which are not covered 
by the compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions specified in Section 2: first, 
disputes with respect to discretionary decisions on permits for marine scientific research by 
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a coastal State; (Article 297(2), LOSC) and secondly, disputes with respect to discretionary 
decisions on fisheries in a coastal State’s EEZ.
 
(Article 297(3), LOSC) The first category of 
dispute is subject to conciliation under Annex V except questions relating to exercise of 
coastal State to designate specific areas or withhold consent in accordance with Article 
246(6) and Article 246(5), respectively. The second category includes its discretionary 
powers for determining the allowable catch, its harvesting capacity, the allocation of 
surpluses to other States and the terms and conditions established in its conservation and 
management laws and regulations. 
Section 3 of Part XV also allows States to declare in writing that it does not accept any of the 
procedures in Section 2 for certain categories of disputes. The State may do this when 
signing, ratifying or acceding to the LOSC or at any time thereafter. (Article 298 (1), LOSC) 
States may exclude the following disputes from the compulsory procedures entailing 
binding decisions in Section 2:  disputes concerning the interpretation or application of 
Articles 15, 74 and 83 on maritime boundary delimitation, or those involving historic bays or 
titles; (Article 298 (1)(a)(i), LOSC) disputes concerning military activities; disputes concerning 
law enforcement activities in respect of  rights and jurisdiction exercised by the coastal State 
over its EEZ resources; and disputes where the UN Security Council is exercising functions 
under the UN Charter. (Article 298(1)(c), LOSC) 
2. The Maritime Region of Southeast Asia 
Southeast Asia is predominantly a maritime region. About 80 per cent of it is covered by sea. 
It is therefore not a surprise that the sea dominates Southeast Asia. In pre-modern times, 
great Southeast Asian empires were established which were founded on the concept of sea 
power. In Southeast Asia, the sea is an important source of livelihood and food; and a 
source of maritime threats. The distinctively maritime character of the region makes the sea 
and issues with regard to the sea important in the international relations of the region. The 
maritime strategic geography of the Southeast Asian region has major implications for 
maritime security: first, the high density of shipping traffic in the region; second, the 
number of key straits and navigational chokepoints; and third, unresolved overlapping and 
contested maritime and territorial issues.  
2.1. Member States of Southeast Asia 
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Geographically, Southeast Asia is a subregion of Asia, consisting of the countries that are 
geographically south of China, east of India, west of New Guinea and north of Australia. 
Most people think of the ten states comprising the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) as the complete listing of Southeast Asian states. These ten States are: Brunei, 
Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand, and Vietnam. However, from a strategic, military, security or even economic 
perspective, the Southeast region broadly defined is certainly bigger than ASEAN. In fact, 
the question of which States belong in ASEAN is a contentious issue in itself. Severino 
argues, thus: “One way of defining Southeast Asia, as the concept has evolved, is in terms of 
what it is not. It does not include China, Japan and Korea. Not Australia and New Zealand. 
Not India, or Bangladesh, which, until 1971, was part of Pakistan.” (2006, p. 41) The sundry 
of regional or multilateral architecture of institutions in the region further blurs the 
distinction.  
Of course, ASEAN is conspicuously the pre-eminent regional organization in Southeast Asia. 
The geo-political and economic organization ASEAN was formed in 1967 with its five original 
members: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Since then, 
membership has expanded to further include five more states, Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), 
Laos, and Vietnam, and Cambodia, which was the last to join in 1999. Currently, accession 
negotiations are under way with two states, Papua New Guinea and East Timor. Then there 
is ASEAN plus 3, which includes the present members of ASEAN together with China, Japan, 
and South Korea. Then there is the East Asia Summit, which includes the present members 
of ASEAN Plus Three together with Australia, India, New Zealand, Russia and the United 
States. Finally, there is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), an informal multilateral dialogue of 
27 members that seeks to address security issues in the Asia-Pacific region whose 
membership includes the members of the East Asia Summit plus Bangladesh, Canada, 
Mongolia, North Korea, Pakistan, and the European Union (EU).  
The list of States does get more and more problematic as the membership expands from the 
original ten members of ASEAN. It will certainly take great imagination and argument to 
include the EU or countries as distant as New Zealand or United States as part of Southeast 
Asia but this is definitely not the focus of this paper.   
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Whilst the question of what States properly constitute the Southeast Asian region is beyond 
the scope of this paper, for its purposes, the analysis will be restricted to the member-States 
of ASEAN and China principally because of it being a claimant in the South China Sea.  
2.2. Territorial and maritime boundary disputes in Southeast Asia 
The semi-enclosed maritime spaces of Southeast Asia are said to be among the most 
disputed maritime spaces in the world. The region is host to a complex range of sovereignty 
disputes over territory as well as un-delimited maritime jurisdictional zones and 
entitlements arising out of disputed features involving multiple claimant States. The 
following list enumerates some of the territorial and maritime disputes in Southeast Asia: 
• Territorial dispute between Laos and Thailand along the Mekong River  
• Territorial dispute between Myanmar and Thailand along the Moei River 
• Territorial dispute between Cambodia and Thailand in the Gulf of Thailand 
• Territorial dispute between Cambodia and Vietnam in the Gulf of Thailand 
• Territorial dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia over Sabah 
• Territorial dispute between Malaysia and Brunei over Louisa Reef 
• Territorial dispute between the Philippines and China over Scarborough Shoal 
• Territorial dispute between the Philippines and China over Mischief Reef 
• Territorial dispute between Brunei and Malaysia over Limbang Valley 
• Maritime boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin between Vietnam and China  
• Maritime boundary along the Vietnamese coast between Vietnam, China, and 
Taiwan 
• Maritime boundary in the waters north of the Natuna Islands between Indonesia, 
China, and Taiwan 
• Maritime boundary north of Borneo between Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Malaysia and 
Brunei 
• Territorial and maritime boundary dispute over islands in the southern reaches of 
the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands by Vietnam, Malaysia, The 
Philippines, Taiwan, and China 
• Maritime boundary off the coast of central Philippines and Luzon between the 
Philippines, China, and Taiwan 
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• Territorial and maritime boundary dispute over islands in the northern reaches of 
the South China Sea, including the Paracel Islands between Vietnam, China, and 
Taiwan 
• Maritime boundary in the Luzon Strait between the Philippines and Taiwan 
 
The above list of existing unresolved territorial and maritime boundary disputes in 
Southeast Asia is long and not exhaustive. In this regard, it seems natural for policy makers 
and even analysts to become pessimistic, agitated and cynical. Indeed, the task of resolving 
these disputes is herculean. However, there has also been much progress. The following is a 
list of settled territorial disputes and maritime boundary delimitation agreements in 
Southeast Asia: 
• Case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor 
(Malaysia v Singapore): Settlement Agreement, 26 April 2005  
• Agreement between the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia concerning the delimitation of the 
continental shelf boundary, 26 June 2003 
• Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Viet 
Nam on the delimitation of the territorial seas, the exclusive economic zones and 
continental shelves in Beibu Bay/Bac Bo Gulf, 25 December 2000  
• Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the 
Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam on the delimitation of the 
maritime boundary between the two countries in the Gulf of Thailand, 9 August 
1997 
• Agreement between the Government of Malaysia and the Government of the 
Republic of Singapore to Delimit Precisely the Territorial Waters Boundary in 
Accordance with the Straits Settlements and Johore Territorial Waters Agreement 
1927 (1995)  
• Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the 
Government of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma on the delimitation of 
the maritime boundary between the two countries in the Andaman Sea, 25 July 1980  
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• Treaty between the Kingdom of Thailand and Malaysia relating to the delimitation of 
the territorial seas of the two countries, 24 October 1979  
• Memorandum of Understanding between the Kingdom of Thailand and Malaysia on 
the delimitation of the continental shelf boundary between the two countries in the 
Gulf of Thailand (with map), 24 October 1979   
• Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia relating to the delimitation of the sea-bed 
boundary between the two countries in the Andaman Sea, 11 December 1975   
• Treaty between the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of Singapore relating to 
the delimitation of the territorial seas of the two countries in the Strait of Singapore, 
25 May 1973  
• Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, The Government 
of Malaysia and the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand Relating to the 
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Boundaries in the Northern Part of the Strait of 
Malacca, 21 December 1971   
• Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia relating to the delimitation of a continental 
shelf boundary between the two countries in the northern part of the Straits of 
Malacca and in the Andaman Sea, 17 December 1971  
• Treaty between the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia Relating to the delimitation 
of the Territorial Seas of the Two Countries in the Strait of Malacca, 17 March 1970 
• Agreement between the Government of Malaysia and the Government of Indonesia 
on the delimitation of the continental shelves between the two countries, 27 
October 1969 
 
The above list is from the UN Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS) 
website. It must be assumed that the list is not exhaustive. There are other extensive 
studies which discuss in detail the various territorial and maritime disputes in Southeast 
Asia, which are beyond the current scope of this paper.  
3. Opportunities, Challenges and Recommendations 
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3.1. Widespread ratification of the LOSC and willingness to negotiate on the basis of 
international law 
The Southeast Asian region, despite unresolved territorial and maritime issues, is largely 
peaceful and stable. The continuing reliance on international law by States to articulate 
their competing claims and positions as well as the widespread ratification of the LOSC 
contribute to regional peace and stability. China, as well as all the member States of ASEAN 
except for Cambodia, is a party to the LOSC. Cambodia signed the LOSC in 1983, but has yet 
to ratify it.  This is both positive and promising. Many of the States in the region have 
enacted or revised domestic law in conformity with the Convention. The more recent ones 
include, the Law of the Sea of Viet Nam of 21 June 2012; and Republic Act No. 9522 which 
seeks to define the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines, enacted on 17 April 2009.  
Many States in the region, including China, have also made submissions or preliminary 
information indicative of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles 
to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. The following have made 
preliminary submissions or information indicative of the outer limits of the continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
Brunei (12 May 2009); China (11 May 2009); Indonesia (16 June 2008); Malaysia-Vietnam 
joint submission (6 May 2009); Myanmar (16 December 2008); Philippines (8 April 2009); 
Vietnam (7 May 2009). Not all of these submissions are in dispute. In fact, it is only the joint 
submission by Malaysia and Vietnam which is relevant to the South China Sea and has 
elicited protests from other claimant States. On May 6, 2009, China through a note verbale 
challenged the joint submission made by Malaysia and Vietnam. In response, Vietnam and 
Malaysia lodged diplomatic counter-protests in response to China’s protest in May 8 and 20, 
2009, respectively. On August 4, 2009, the Philippines also filed a diplomatic protest over 
the submissions made by Vietnam and Malaysia. On April 5, 2011, the Philippines also filed a 
diplomatic protest in response to China’s May 7, 2009 diplomatic protest.  
Another significant stabilizing factor in the region is the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), signed by the member-States of ASEAN and China a 
decade ago. (Wu Shicun and Ren Huaifeng, 2003) This is the first time that China has signed 
a multilateral agreement, albeit one considered non-legally binding, on the issue of the 
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South China Sea. In June 2003, Beijing signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which 
contains a dispute settlement procedure instituted among the ASEAN countries in June 
1976, thereby agreeing not to “participate in any activity which shall constitute a threat to 
the political and economic stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity” of the other 
signatory states. Taiwan, one of the six parties directly involved in the sovereignty and 
maritime jurisdictional dispute in the South China Sea, was excluded from regional efforts to 
formulate a code of conduct because of ASEAN’s adherence to the “One-China Policy.” 
Taiwan has also been barred from participating in other regional security dialogue 
processes, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). (Song, 2000)  
The Declaration is a testimony to regional efforts that spanned almost a decade of intense 
negotiations, underscoring the importance of regional security and the establishment of 
mutual trust and confidence among all the claimant countries. The Declaration reaffirmed 
the commitment of all the claimant countries to universally-recognized principles of 
international law including the UN Charter and the LOSC. (See, Preamble, Declaration, 2002) 
The Declaration likewise affirmed the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast 
Asia between ASEAN members, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (1954). 
The Declaration is a political document, and consequently, not legally binding. (Buszynski, 
2003; Thao, 2000) It likewise does not resolve the competing claims of territorial 
sovereignty issues in the South China Sea nor does it impose any enforceable obligations on 
the parties. However, the greater significance of the Declaration lies in the commitment of 
the parties to the maintenance of peace and stability, which are requisites to regional 
growth and development. The Declaration evinces the intent of all the parties to sustain 
negotiations conducted in good faith towards the eventual resolution of the issue. Most 
importantly, the Declaration has substantially improved the level of trust and confidence 
among the claimant countries and has been instrumental in other bilateral and multilateral 
initiatives that build upon its principles. 
However, despite the lapse of over a decade since the DOC was signed, the parties have yet 
to agree on a Code of Conduct (COC) for the South China Sea. Still, there have been some 
assuring developments such as the adoption of the Guidelines to Implement the DOC in July 
2011 and the adoption of the Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea in July 2012.   
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In general, States in the region profess their willingness to negotiate on the basis of 
international law and in particular the provisions of the LOSC. Since almost all of the States 
with territorial and maritime delimitation disputes in the region are signatories or parties to 
the LOSC, they have the primary obligation under Part XV to resolve their disputes by 
peaceful means. (Article 279, LOSC) However, even without going through the formal 
compulsory procedure in any of the fora available, the claimant countries using the other 
substantive provisions of the LOSC may define their maritime zone claims in accordance 
with the rules established in the LOSC. These may include the following: (1) specification of 
their precise claims; (2) drawing and publishing the proper basepoints and baselines along 
their coasts; and (3) negotiating to agree which features are islands. For example, almost all 
of the coastal States in East and Southeast Asia have implemented straight baselines which 
have been criticized as being “excessive,” (Roach and Smith, 2000, pp.  47-80) and clearly 
breach many of the conditions laid down in Article 7 of the LOSC. (Bateman and Schofield, 
2008, pp. 8-16) Since the starting point for the delimitation of maritime boundaries is often 
the construction of strict equidistance or median lines, excessive straight baseline claims 
need to be adjusted since such potentially deflect the line of equidistance to the distinct 
advantage of the State that constructed them, which can then complicate maritime 
boundary delimitation negotiations. 
3.2. Reluctance to submit disputes to international adjudication 
The likelihood of a dispute in the region to be submitted to an international tribunal for 
resolution appears to be remote. There seems to be a general reluctance among Asian 
countries to submit their disputes for international adjudication. (Palmer, 1998, p. 579). 
However, the general reluctance to adjudicate is not unique to Southeast Asian countries. 
Notably and in sharp contrast, in other disputes, involving trade, for instance, the same 
States hesitant to resolve their territorial and maritime disputes utilizing formal 
international adjudicative procedures and forums will readily submit cases to the dispute 
settlement procedures of the World Trade Organization.  
It will be too simplistic and not entirely accurate to ascribe this disinclination to purely 
cultural reasons. It will be hard to over-generalize and assert a universal Asian culture in this 
regard. However, the significant role of cultural subtleties in the international relations of 
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Southeast Asian States, and in fact, even elsewhere, is undeniable. In formal and covert 
dispute resolutions mechanisms, there are winners and losers, which undoubtedly make 
one of the parties lose face, a situation which the States find unacceptable and try hard to 
avoid if possible. The high degree of emotions involved in maritime and territorial disputes 
in Asia, and the importance that Asian culture places on the maintenance of good-
neighborly relations and peace, make them reluctant to bring their neighboring States to a 
third-party dispute settlement procedure.  
In addition to the abovementioned cultural reasons, the time and exorbitant costs involved 
in undertaking a case in any of the available international fora also discourage countries in 
Southeast Asia. Another possible reason why submitting the dispute to international 
adjudication is not under serious consideration is that the basis of their respective claims 
are not especially compelling in international law terms. (Schofield and Storey, 2009, p. 10). 
There are other pragmatic factors such as intra and extra-regional power imbalances as well 
as deepening economic interdependence amongst the States of the region which are 
disincentives due to the possible economic and trade repercussions of a disruption in 
friendly relations between States involved in a dispute.  
The States in the region have very little experience in litigation at the international level 
with regard to the settlement of territorial and maritime disputes. As previously mentioned 
in an earlier section, only three disputes have referred to the ICJ, two cases submitted to 
ITLOS, and three to the PCA. The majority of territorial disputes in Southeast Asia have very 
little likelihood of being resolved this way, as submission to an international tribunal is seen 
by States across the region as a remedy of last resort preferring bilateral dispute resolution 
instead. (Charney and Alexander, 1993, pp. 915, 1057, 1135, 1145) Moreover, many States 
in the region do not recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, such as China, Vietnam, 
Malaysia and Brunei. While the Philippines does, it has made a reservation that excludes 
territorial disputes from its acceptance of the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction submitted on 18 
January 1972. Since the consent of the parties is the basis of ICJ jurisdiction, if the above 
States choose to bring their territorial and maritime disputes to the ICJ, they must first sign 
a special agreement accepting the jurisdiction of the ICJ. Despite its pre-eminence as an 
international forum, two-thirds of States, including China, have not submitted a case to the 
ICJ. (Posner and Figueiredo, 2005, 614). The other reasons why States hesitate to submit a 
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dispute to the ICJ for resolution include concerns over its partiality, which consequently 
affects compliance. (Posner and Figueiredo, 2005, pp. 608-610; Mackenzie and Sands, 2003, 
p. 275) Posner and Figueiredo, using statistical methods, interrogated the charge of bias 
against judges of the ICJ and found strong evidence that judges favor the states that appoint 
them and whose wealth level is close to their own states. (Posner and Figueiredo, 2005, p. 
624) 
The submission of a territorial and maritime boundary dispute to ITLOS does not appear to 
be an accepted mode of settling territorial and maritime disputes in the region or 
elsewhere. In fact, to date, there has only been one such case filed with ITLOS: the case 
concerning delimitation of the maritime boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the 
Bay of Bengal between Bangladesh and Myanmar, decided by ITLOS in 2012. Annex VII 
arbitrations appear to be more utilized, with at least three cases filed with the PCA by States 
in the region as mentioned above.  
The 2013 Annex VII arbitration case by the Philippines against China over the West 
Philippine Sea -- currently pending with the PCA -- appears to be a positive development in 
the use of LOSC dispute settlement procedures. On the other hand, China refused to 
participate in the arbitral proceedings insisting that the dispute be resolved bilaterally 
through other diplomatic means. It is definitely possible and foreseeable for any of the 
other claimant states to submit a similar petition for international adjudication. However, 
given the current geopolitical, economic and military conditions in the region, this appears 
remote at the moment. At this stage, the other claimant States as well as the rest of the 
world are awaiting how the arbitral tribunal will decide both the prejudicial question of 
jurisdiction as well as the merits of the Philippine submission.  
Whilst the LOSC allows States parties to the Convention to choose at any time its preferred 
choice of procedure for the settlement of disputes (Article 287 (1), LOSC), none of the 
claimant States over the South China Sea has done so. In effect, this means that if a dispute 
arises between any of the claimant States, it may only be submitted to arbitration in 
accordance with Annex VII, unless the parties decide otherwise. (Article 287(5), LOSC) 
The Convention further allows States parties at any time to declare in writing that they do 
not accept any of the compulsory procedures under Section 2 for certain categories of 
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disputes (Article 298, LOSC). China, on 25 August 2006, has exercised this right and has 
submitted a Declaration under Article 298 of the Convention, as follows:  
The Government of the People's Republic of China does not accept any of the 
procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention with respect to all 
the categories of disputes referred to in paragraph 1 (a) (b) and (c) of Article 298 of 
the Convention. (China Declaration, 2006) 
3.3. Recommendations  
International law allows a number of mechanisms for the avoidance and settlement of 
disputes, which includes political means such as negotiation and consultation, mediation 
and good offices, conciliation, investigation, and such judicial means as arbitration and 
international adjudication. This section will examine some of these modes of adjudication or 
dispute resolution in the Southeast Asian context.  
3.3.1. Submit disputes to international adjudication 
International adjudication is a method of international dispute settlement that involves the 
referral of the dispute to an impartial third-party tribunal--normally either an arbitral 
tribunal or an international court--for binding decision, usually on the basis of international 
law. While the discussion above alluded to the reluctance of most States in the region to 
submit their disputes to an international tribunal, a long-term goal among States to ensure 
lasting resolution to their disputes should include the submission of their dispute to a third 
party for settlement. Of course, this does not preclude States from resolving their disputes 
bilaterally through diplomatic means in order to arrive at an agreement. The claimant States 
should show their sincerity in their desire to settle their disputes and their political maturity 
as independent modern nations in the international community by seeking a mutually 
acceptable settlement by negotiations, and failing such, by submitting their disputes to a 
third party for settlement.  
3.3.2. Explore other methods of dispute resolution 
There are other methods of dispute resolution available at the international level, including 
negotiation, mediation, and diplomacy. These alternative modes of dispute resolution 
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should be viewed within the context of the various regional initiatives and fora. For 
example, the potential for militarized conflict over a number of territorial as well inter-State 
disputes in the ASEAN has been mitigated, if not always avoided, by the development of the 
key ASEAN norms of non-intervention in the internal affairs of another State and the respect 
for the independence and sovereignty of each member State.  These norms are embodied in 
ASEAN’s 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia. The TAC, some 
scholars have argued, is the central pillar of ASEAN and the source of the norms of non-
confrontation and consensus building which is the key in maintaining peace, stability and 
order in the region.  The enduring presence of maritime tension over disputed territories 
between and among the various ASEAN States may be unavoidable altogether but the 
commitment of the member States to building regional cooperation and the 
institutionalization of multilateral fora have prevented the escalation or eruption of military 
confrontation and war.  The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China 
Sea signed by ASEAN countries and China evinced a willingness among claimants to resolve 
disputes by peaceful means, to exercise self-restraint, and to approach the dispute 
multilaterally. While it has not entirely eliminated unilateral actions by claimants in the 
South China Sea, it has definitely dissipated some tension among the claimants and 
provided a venue to address the issue within the region diplomatically.  
There are some current developments within the framework of ASEAN which could 
potentially expand the role of ASEAN in settling intra-regional disputes. These include the 
adoption of the ASEAN Charter which includes a chapter which deals with issues pertaining 
to the settlement of disputes, and the adoption of the ASEAN Dispute Settlement 
Mechanisms (DSM) on April 2009 to address disputes arising from the differences in the 
interpretation and application of the Charter as well as other ASEAN instruments. The DSM 
provides for a variety of means to settle disagreements, including consultation between 
parties, mediation, and arbitration, and the referral of unresolved disputes to the ASEAN 
summit. 
3.3.3. Explore option of focusing on less substantive issues not involving sovereignty 
issues, including considering joint development of resources as an option 
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The positions of the individual countries who have  maritime or territorial disputes with one 
another may seem intractable from a domestic politics point of view, creating an 
impediment for negotiations to proceed. However, on other issues of a more benign nature 
such as trade or issues that transcend boundaries such as marine environmental protection 
and marine scientific research, or issues of grave importance such as terrorism, the 
countries have invariably been more than willing to set aside their positions and cooperate 
with other States, even with those States they have maritime or territorial disputes with. In 
these instances, their differences in position are more prudently construed and interpreted, 
and take on secondary importance to other issues, thus, permitting cooperation. The parties 
can also deliberately set aside the issue of sovereignty and consider joint development of 
the resources as an option without prejudice to their respective claims.  
However, while developing countries are keen to promote investments in maritime areas 
that are subject to competing sovereignty disputes or overlapping claims, investors are 
expectedly wary. The failure to settle overlapping claims have made such areas as the South 
China Sea and the Aegean Sea unattractive to investors. However, as has been shown in the 
case of Red Sea region with respect to minerals between Sudan and Saudi Arabia; and the 
Timor Sea in the case of petroleum between Indonesia and Australia, coastal States may be 
willing to resort to the joint development of mineral deposits in areas of overlapping claims 
even in the absence of an agreement to settle their claims. The Joint Marine Scientific 
Undertaking (JMSU) signed by the State-owned oil companies of China, Vietnam and the 
Philippines in March 2005 in order to identify oil and natural gas deposits for possible future 
development is indicative of the political will of the States to develop the disputed area 
jointly and their common desire to benefit from the natural resources in the disputed area. 
The JMSU was signed on 14 March 2005 by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and Vietnam Oil and Gas Corporation 
(PetroVietnam). However, the JMSU lapsed in June 2008 and was not extended by the 
parties; and since the JMSU ended, no other cooperative undertakings among the 
disputants have been launched.  
3.4.4. Capacity-building among States in Southeast Asia  
24 
 
States within the Southeast Asian region are at varying stages of economic development 
with varying priorities and national goals. The countries in the region are also marked by 
great disparities among them in terms of naval and military strengths. There is also room for 
strategic analysis in this respect. The growing economic power of China, in the region and 
beyond, has drastically altered the regional economic and military balance, which has 
enabled China to expand its political and diplomatic sphere of influence. The potential 
impact of China’s reach has caused concern all across the East Asian mainland, the Indian 
Ocean region and made the United States uneasy. The March 2009 incident involving the 
USNS Impeccable brought to fore issues concerning China’s growing assertiveness in 
enforcing what it regards as its maritime rights and China’s interpretation of international 
maritime law, which in some instances are not shared by other States. The modernization of 
the PLA Navy and its plan to develop blue-water capabilities which will give it the capacity to 
project its power into the region and beyond will affect the maritime strategic environment 
as well as the tone and tenor of dialogue on regional maritime disputes. 
However, instead of a military build-up in the interim before their disputes are submitted 
for international adjudication, the States in the region should focus on securing for 
themselves the necessary resources to develop the capacity in other areas equally 
important in the resolution of their maritime and territorial disputes -- such as the 
ratification of and compliance with the relevant international instruments, the drawing of 
legally defensible baselines, and improved capacity for maritime regulation and 
enforcement, among others.  
Governments across the region are aware that clearly-defined maritime boundaries are 
indispensable for good relations among States and effective ocean management. However, 
only a few coastal States have agreed maritime boundaries with their neighbors. In the case 
of many of the States in the region, the lack of a range of specialist legal and technical skills 
required in boundary delimitation could be a serious impediment.  
Conclusion 
The persistent territorial disputes over maritime territories in Southeast Asia challenge the 
peace and stability of the region. There is also the issue of unexplored resources which 
cannot be utilized and exploited because of sovereignty disputes. Often, disputed islands 
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and rocks have little value per se. However, their real value lies in the maritime zones that 
they could potentially generate which may contain valuable fisheries stocks and potential 
mineral deposits such oil and gas. While it can be safely asserted that the region is largely at 
peace and the disputes have not erupted into sustained military conflict, there still exist 
intermittent tensions among the rival claimants. In the course of articulating or advancing 
their respective claims to disputed maritime areas, countries will often assert legal and 
historical arguments in support of their claims and will take various steps to occupy disputed 
territory. This is the same scenario in the disputed territories in Southeast Asia. As a result 
of these postures, tensions remain high and the potential for armed conflict remains. Thus, 
the States involved must remain committed to cooperation, diplomacy and the use of 
peaceful means of settling the disputes.  
The value of establishing maritime boundaries that are of sound basis in international law 
and therefore respected by the international community is self-evident. The fundamental 
purpose of maritime boundary delimitation is to provide clarity and certainty to all maritime 
States and users in order to minimize inter-state conflict and promote the sustainable 
management and governance of the oceans. Uncertain boundaries increase political and 
security risks. Unresolved boundaries have serious economic consequences as such may 
stall exploration of resources, disrupt fishing or impede shipping; hamper environmental 
conservation measures; and may also trigger intense diplomatic disputes affecting economic 
relations. Conversely, the certainty of a nation’s boundaries enhances stability and 
promotes peaceful relations among neighboring States sharing the same boundaries and 
resources. 
The LOSC constitutes the primary legal framework in addressing the conflicting maritime 
claims in Southeast Asia, particularly in the South China Sea. The LOSC is binding upon all 
claimant countries to the South China Sea, with the exception of Taiwan, all being parties to 
it. This fact need not be overstressed since all the parties to the dispute invariably invoke 
the provisions of the LOSC as a basis for their respective claims. 
The LOSC clearly creates an obligation among claimant countries to settle their conflicting 
claims peacefully, using any of forums specified under the UN Charter and the Convention 
itself. However, since the dispute settlement mechanism within the framework of the LOSC 
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operates on the basis of the sovereign equality of states, the submission of a dispute to such 
a forum depends on the willingness of the parties. Moreover, while the legal framework 
under the LOSC offers some options, the highly complicated nature of the disputes in the 
Southeast Asian region especially those pertaining to the overlapping and conflicting claims 
over the South China Sea, tests the limits of international law and obscures the possibility of 
a legal solution. Moreover, the cultural aversion of Asians against a judicial settlement, 
where there are victors and losers, almost renders this option illusory. (Bautista, 2007, p. 
701) 
The option for joint development and other practical cooperative mechanisms should 
continue to remain, and is always a positive development while issues of sovereignty remain 
unresolved. Increasing functional cooperation in other areas, aside from trade, such as in 
areas of security, educational, cultural, and scientific cooperation, marine environmental 
protection and marine scientific research, among others, should be encouraged. The LOSC 
prescribes provisional arrangements of a practical nature (Article 74(3) and 83(3), LOSC) 
during the transitional phase before a final agreement is reached in overlapping EEZ or 
continental shelves. In respect of the South China Sea disputes, determining the area which 
may be subject to joint development is essentially problematic since sovereignty is disputed 
and the status of the features and maritime zones they could potentially generate are 
likewise ambiguous.  
Notwithstanding heightened tensions in the region, the possibility of actual armed or 
militarized conflict over territorial disputes appears to be remote. The submission of existing 
disputes to legally-binding dispute settlement mechanisms appears unlikely. That said, the 
Philippine Annex VII arbitration case against China over the South China Sea should be seen 
as a positive move in the right direction. It is good to remember that an essential factual 
precursor prior to the filing of the case was the 2012 standoff between China and the 
Philippines over Scarborough Shoal. (Bautista, 2013) In the midst of intense diplomatic, 
trade and even threat of actual use of armed force, the Philippines has chosen instead to file 
the arbitration case to resolve the dispute with China. While the factual situation on the 
ground highlighted the stark asymmetry between the economic power and military 
capabilities of the two countries, the resort to arbitration highlighted the perception of 
international law as a more level playing where the rule of law still reigns supreme. 
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The non-participation of China in the arbitration, although regrettable, is part of its 
sovereign prerogative. The ruling of the arbitration panel as well as history itself and global 
public opinion will be the ultimate judges if indeed China has chosen the appropriate tactical 
move in this conflict. Nonetheless, overall, there is a continuing reliance and use of 
international law terminology and notably LOSC provisions in the articulation of the 
respective claims by States in the region. This has led not just to greater clarity amongst the 
claimant States of their positions but has also prevented conflict. Thus, the LOSC, including 
its dispute settlement regime, will continue to play a substantial role in the eventual 
resolution of the competing territorial and maritime jurisdictional claims in Southeast Asia.  
Notes:  
This is a revised and updated version of a paper of the same title presented by the author at 
“UNCLOS at 30”, International Conference for the Anniversary of Signature of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Qingdao, China, 22-24 November 2012. The 
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